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1INTRODUCTION
The concept of human rights is actually quite a simple one that appeals to a rational, 
inherent, and natural sense of justice and one that both proscribes and prescribes different 
kinds of state and non-state action meant to promote and protect human dignity. But the 
substantive content of human rights, the empirical reality of how such rights are enjoyed, 
and the degree to which they are protected are complex, multifaceted, and present 
significant challenges for a political science of human rights that relies on comparative 
measures and systematic analytical techniques. Human rights are specially bounded by a 
constellation of concepts that complicate their measurement – distinctions between 
process and outcome, principles and standards, rights and obligations, violation and 
protection, among others. This paper builds on a series of human rights measurement 
frameworks developed over the last few years (see Landman 2002; Landman and 
Carvalho 2009, forthcoming) that are based on accepted international principles and 
standards in order to map the issues of measurement that human rights research has 
already addressed and to highlight the avenues for further inquiry in the field.
This paper’s point of departure is that human rights have become an accepted legal and 
normative standard through which to judge the quality of human dignity as it is 
experienced by nearly six billion people around the world in a variety of very different 
social, economic, and political contexts. The standard has arisen through the concerted 
efforts of thousands of people over many years inspired by a simple set of ideas that have 
become codified through the mechanism of public international law and realized through 
2the domestic legal frameworks and governmental institutions of states around the world. 
As is clear from evidence collected in a variety of different ways, however, this 
realization is incomplete, where there remains a large and variable gap between the 
expectations for human dignity outlined through human rights standards and the reality of 
the precariousness of those rights as they are variously enjoyed around the world. Both 
the standard and the gap are subject to measurement, where we understand measurement 
to be the cognitive process through which abstract concepts find numerical expression in 
the form of valid, reliable and meaningful indicators. The paper does not concern itself 
with the ongoing and unresolved debates about the absence of agreed philosophical 
foundations for human rights, nor does it engage with the persistent arguments based on 
cultural relativism. Rather, it takes for granted that the extant international law of human 
rights is both a useful starting point for the measurement of human rights and the 
outcome of a long and iterated negotiated settlement across many diverse state and non-
state actors about what constitutes the basic guarantees for the realization of human 
dignity. By delineating the purely legal conception of human rights from its philosophical 
and socio-anthropological perspectives, this paper attempts to provide scholars and 
practitioners in the field a secure (although partial) basis from which to commence the 
task of monitoring and measurement.
The paper follows the development of international human rights law, including the main
instruments, general comments, and debates surrounding the interpretation of human 
rights from the larger academic, non-governmental, and policy communities. The 
framework of content that we present moves well beyond the ‘generations’ approaches to 
3human rights or any privileging of particular rights to show that human rights now 
comprise a set of standards (i.e. regarding human rights for all individuals and the rights 
of particular groups) that have different dimensions grounded in the notion of state 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil. In this way, we argue that all rights give rise to 
a negative obligation of states to refrain from violating rights and to prevent third parties 
from doing the same, as well as a positive obligation that requires that states provide the 
necessary resources for fulfilling their rights commitments. This means that measures for 
human rights will necessarily include those that capture their violation and their 
realisation, which we group into the notions of rights in principle (i.e. those formal legal 
commitments that states make), rights in practice (i.e. the enjoyment of rights by 
individuals on their own or as members of a group), and rights as policy (i.e. the 
structures, processes, and outcomes of governmental efforts to promote and protect 
human rights). This framework also includes reference to a series of organising principles
-- availability, accessibility, adaptability, and acceptability -- that deepen the 
understanding of implementation of human rights and the processes involved in their 
realization.
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The content of human rights as established in international law is dependent on the 
creation and adoption of legal standards by states; norms that enable the human rights 
community to hold states accountable for those actions that violate the dignity of
individuals residing within their jurisdictions. Human rights standards have been the 
unique contribution made by international law to the discourse on human rights. Counted 
4among these standards are the main international treaties for the promotion and protection 
of human rights,1 and the various regional instruments found in Europe,2 the Inter-
American System,3 and African Union.4 Across these instruments, there has been a 
process of iteration, consensus, and sedimentation of ideas around the core content of 
human rights; however, these various standards comprise only the substantive portion of 
the concept. Human rights also include procedural or ‘process’ features, which are those 
facets of the concept that states need to consider when implementing the standards that 
they have accepted. This section of the paper discusses the features of human rights as 
elaborated in international law and the interpretations of the law by international human 
rights treaty bodies, and special mechanisms. It also addresses one of the most 
controversial debates that arose at the time of the drafting of the two International 
                                                
1 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and its protocols;  International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 and its protocols; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, 1979 and its protocol; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984 and its protocol; Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 1989 and its protocols; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990; and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
2006 and its protocol. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance was signed in 2006 but has not yet entered force.
2 There are three systems functioning in Europe in parallel. They are listed here along with the main human 
rights instruments they have produced: Council of Europe (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 and its protocols; European Social Charter, 1961, revised in 1996; 
European Agreement relating to Persons participating in Proceedings of the European Commission and 
Court of Human Rights,1969 and 1996; European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1987; European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 
1992;  The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1995; and Council of Europe 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 2005), The European Union (Treaty on 
European Union, 1992 and subsequent amendments; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, 2000) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (various Permanent Council 
decisions and formal commitments by the OSCE on human rights).
3 American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 and its two protocols; Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture, 1985; Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, 
1994; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against 
Women, 1994; and Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Persons with Disabilities, 1999.
4 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1981 and its two protocols; African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child, 1990; and African Union Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, 1969.
5Covenants in the 1950s and 1960s – the creation of ‘categories’ of human rights. Human 
rights create obligations on states for their fulfillment. The nature of these obligations has 
also been debated under the notion of ‘dimensions’, which is also tied into the 
controversy related to the categories of rights. We briefly sketch the literature on the
various elements that comprise the concept of human rights as interpreted by the 
institutions involved in standard setting, implementation, and monitoring at the 
international level and formulate a comprehensive model of human rights in international 
law. 
The content of human rights
As a prelude to the discussion on the constitutive elements of human rights, this section 
takes a step back to understand what is meant by a ‘concept’ in the general sense of the 
term and the manner in which the meaning and measurement of concepts are inextricably 
linked. There are at least two interrelated views on this issue: the semantic approach 
which focuses on the definition of a concept as the primary and only source of meaning, 
and the causal ontological approach which maintains that a concept comprises both the 
‘theoretical and empirical analysis of [an] object or phenomenon referred to by the word’ 
(Goertz 2006: 3-4). This paper adheres to the latter approach and attempts to highlight 
human rights as a specific theoretical and empirical concept. This exercise has important 
implications for the measures used to monitor human rights and the conclusions that are 
derived from the results. 
6A concept can be understood as being multilevel and multidimensional in character. 
There are essentially three levels at which a concept can be mapped: a) the ‘basic level’, 
which consists of the theoretical propositions about the core meaning of the concept, b) 
the ‘secondary level’ that highlight the constitutive elements of the concept, and c) the 
‘indicator/data level’ that operationalise these elements into specific measures (Goertz
2006: 4-6, 30-65). Such a conceptualization is very similar to the ‘measurement cycle’ 
proposed by Adcock and Collier (2001: 531) who distinguish between the following: a) 
background concept, b) systematized concept, c) indicators, and d) scores on units of 
analysis (e.g. individuals, groups, municipalities, sub-national units, and nation-states). A 
background concept is ‘the broad constellation of meanings and understandings 
associated with a given concept’. This background concept undergoes a process of 
conceptualization by a scholar or a group of scholars and is transformed into a 
systematized concept which is ‘a specific formulation’ of the background concept. The 
second level, i.e. measurement of the concept begins when the systematized concept is 
operationalised into indicators. The indicators are used to score cases and the analysis of 
observed scores is in turn, used to refine these indicators. The modified indicators can 
then assist in fine-tuning the systematized concept and provide insights into the meanings 
associated with the background concept (see also Landman 2006a: 76-78).
Human rights, at the basic or background level, are conceptualized as minimum legal 
standards accepted by states that a) ensure the protection of the dignity of individuals, b) 
define the limits of state behaviour towards their residents and c) can be used to hold 
states accountable for the failure to meet these standards (Chapman and Russell 2002; 
7Sepúlveda 2003; Nickel 2007). These rights have been distinguished into three
‘categories’: a) civil and political rights, b) economic, social, and cultural rights, and c) 
solidarity rights. This classification of rights has attracted considerable debate with one 
group making the claim that these three categories create distinct and separate obligations 
on states for the provision of rights; on the other hand, scholars have taken the stand that 
while the core content of each human right is distinctly separate from another, each right
creates obligations on states for implementation and monitoring that are similar, a point 
that is addressed later in the paper.
The concept of human rights can be delineated further into three ‘secondary level’ 
concepts: ‘rights-in principle’, ‘rights-in-practice’, and ‘rights as policy’ (see Landman 
2002).5 Rights measured in principle evaluate the international and national commitments 
made by States (de jure State compliance). Rights in principle are the necessary condition 
among these three dimensions at the secondary level of the concept; without the creation 
and acceptance of legal standards by states, human rights would exist (depending on the 
foundational theories of rights) at the moral plane of existence, but they could not be 
justiciable by law. However, legal protections of rights are not sufficient conditions for 
the existence of human rights; by accepting these obligations, states agree to execute 
policies that implement the provisions of these treaties. Hence, rights measured as policy 
processes and outcomes assess the impact of government policies on the enjoyment of 
                                                
5 On similar lines, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
suggests structural, process, and outcome indicators to measure the right to health (Hunt 2006). Malhotra 
and Fasel (2005) reiterate this distinction by proposing two kinds of indicators: a) general indicators that 
measure the extent to which the process of implementing human rights includes the main human rights 
principles such as participation, inclusion, empowerment, non-discrimination and accountability; and b) 
indicators to measure the realisation of substantive human rights.
8rights. Rights measured in practice determine the actual enjoyment of rights by 
individuals and groups in States (de facto State compliance) (Landman and Häusermann
2003; Landman 2004, 2006b). Each of these three ‘elements’ has been measured with
indicators that have helped clarify the content of the concept further and are discussed in 
the subsequent paragraphs.6
[Figure 1 here]
Rights in Principle
Human rights standards are those specific rights that have been codified in international 
law. When a state signs or accedes to an international treaty, it formally accepts a legally 
binding obligation to implement the provisions of the treaty. These standards have been 
adopted at the international, regional and national levels (see the discussion above). They
have also taken the form of two types of documents a) a treaty or declaration protection 
human rights in general and b) the protection of the rights of individuals who are 
members of specific groups (see Table 1).
[Table 1 here]
                                                
6 Goertz (2006: 63-64) suggests that the concepts used at the indicator level should be in a substitutable 
relationship; being able to substitute indicators at this level of the concept allows greater flexibility, 
viability, and opportunity to capture the local context and mechanisms used in research and measurement 
without losing out on the validity of measures. However, this is not acceptable when applied to human 
rights as derived from international human rights law; human rights obligations require states to implement 
policies for that ensure the enjoyment of rights while taking into consideration that the manner in which 
these policies are created and implemented do not violate human rights principles or standards (see CESCR
1999a, 1999b, 2000).
9The International Bill of Rights7 – the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – and 
the 1984 Convention against Torture (CAT) highlight the legal protections that 
individuals can claim from the state. The two Covenants also reflect the most commonly 
accepted categorization of human rights: a) civil and political rights, b) economic, social 
and cultural rights, and c) solidarity rights. Civil and political rights protect the 
personhood of individuals and their ability to participate in the public activities of their 
countries, economic, social and cultural rights provide individuals with access to 
economic resources, social opportunities for growth and the enjoyment of their distinct 
ways of life as well as protection from the arbitrary loss of these rights and solidarity 
rights seek to guarantee for individuals access to public goods like development and the 
environment (Freeman 2002; Landman 2006a). This categorization loosely follows a 
temporal frame; it has been suggested that since human rights are the consequence of
struggles of peoples against oppression and injustice, successive generations of people 
have fought for distinct ‘generations of rights’ with civil and political rights comprising 
the first generation, economic, social and cultural rights, making up the second 
generation, and solidarity rights, the third. Consequently, it was proposed that civil and 
political rights are preeminent and should be attained before the struggles for the other 
rights could be pursued.  This division of human rights has been challenged by scholars 
in the community. Art 1 of the UDHR states that ‘all human beings are …equal in dignity 
                                                
7 This conception suggests that the protection and enjoyment of these rights is as important as fundamental 
rights enshrined in national constitutions (Freeman 2002; Nickel 2007).
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and rights’. A corollary that follows from this statement could be that the rights that they 
enjoy are also equal. The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action states that 
human rights are indivisible, interrelated and interdependent. The enjoyment and 
implementation of one set of rights is inextricably linked to the fulfillment of the other 
rights (Alfredsson and Eide 1999; Donnelly 1999; Freeman 2002). 
The second set of human rights treaties protect the rights of individuals who by virtue of 
being members of a particular group or possessing certain characteristics, may be 
particularly vulnerable to rights violations. Thus, the 1966 International Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) addresses all forms of 
racial discrimination, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) specifies the 
legal protections to be given to the rights of children and the obligations accrued to the 
state to uphold these rights, and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) highlights the rights of women and ensures 
them protection from discrimination on arbitrary or unjustified grounds. Other rights 
protections have been provided to individuals with disabilities, who belong to an 
indigenous or ethnic population, and migrant workers.
Typically, efforts to measure rights in principle include the development of dichotomous 
and polychotomous scales that indicate the degree to which a state has formally 
committed itself to a legal instrument at the international or domestic level. Some efforts 
at measuring rights in principle used dummy variables for treaty ratification (e.g. Keith 
1999; Hathaway 2002; Neumayer 2005), while later efforts also paid attention to state 
11
signature of treaties and reservations filed upon ratification (Landman 2005). Efforts at 
measuring rights in principle at the domestic level have a longer tradition and either count 
provisions in national constitutions that protect different categories of rights (e.g. van 
Maarseveen and van der Tang 1978) or develop an additive scales that code such 
provision across different rights categories (e.g. Foweraker and Landman 1997). At both 
levels of analysis, state commitment to rights in principle can be tracked across time and 
space to the changing legal terrain of rights as it has developed through history.
Rights in Policy
The human rights mechanisms engaged in the clarification of the content of specific 
human rights provide guidance to states on their protection and promotion by elaborating 
on a set of human rights principles. The formal human rights regime establishes two 
types of institutional mechanisms to oversee the implementation of the treaties. The 
treaty bodies allow for the creation of committees of experts that state parties periodically 
report to on the progress in the protection and promotion of human rights. Led by the 
Committee on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR), these mechanisms have taken the lead in clarifying the 
meaning of the right, the nature of state parties’ obligations under the treaty, as well as 
the specific principles and procedures involved in implementing these obligations by 
drafting ‘General Comments’ or ‘General Recommendations’ (see, for example, CCPR 
1989, 2004; CESCR 1990, 2000; CRC 2003). The Special Procedures established by the 
UN Human Rights Council (formerly the UN Commission on Human Rights) are also 
involved in this process. These procedures consist of either groups or individual experts 
12
in the field who often take the initiative in clarifying the scope and content of the human 
right they are monitoring. For example, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Health has taken this opportunity and contributed to 
further clarifying of the right to health in his annual reports to the UN Commission of 
Human Rights and the UN General Assembly (Rosas and Scheinin 2001; Hunt 2003a, 
2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008; Rodley 2003; Symonides 2003). A set of 
‘organizing principles’ – availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability – have 
been elaborated by the CESCR as guidelines for states on the implementation of the 
rights to food, education, and health.8 Availability refers to the resources and 
infrastructure required for the functioning of the resources that states provide as a 
fulfillment of their obligations. It refers to the implementation of policies to ensure that 
the core content of the right are made available to all individuals. Accessibility requires 
that provisions for implementation of the right make the enjoyment of the right accessible 
to all individuals. This principle comprises non-discrimination in access, physical 
accessibility (with regard to safety and convenience) and economic accessibility 
(affordability). Acceptability consists of the relevance, cultural appropriateness and 
quality of the resource being provided. States are obligated to ensure that the provision of 
rights is in keeping with cultural and local sensibilities. The fourth principle, i.e. 
adaptability refers to flexibility in the implementation of policies to provide for the right 
to ensure that such policies adapt to the changing needs of societies and communities
(CESCR 1999a, 1999b, 2000). These indicators that measure implementation of policies 
                                                
8 The General Comment on the Right to Health replaces the principle of adaptability with the principle of 
quality (CESCR 2000: para 12). In addition to these principles, a set of human rights principles have also 
been proposed to take into account when making and implementing human rights policies: non-
discrimination, participation, adequate progress, and effective remedy (UNDP 2000: 93-95).
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to ensure the protection and enjoyment of rights are related to the concept of progressive 
realization of rights. It may be argued that most rights cannot be immediately secured by 
states but call for prioritization due to socio-economic and political conditions that 
determine which rights claims reach urgency, limited resources at the disposal of states, 
and the making and execution of policies to ensure their implementation. If we accept 
this premise, then the indicators that measure the gradual implementation of policies 
using a human rights-based approach would be applicable to all categories of rights.
Since resources available to states are limited, they need to be spent on priority areas 
determined by the state but informed by the state’s human rights obligations. However, it 
was long considered appropriate that civil and political rights created immediate 
obligations on states while economic, social and cultural rights could be implemented 
through progressive realization subject to the availability of resources. Recent 
interpretations of these rights however, have recognized that they also impose an 
immediate obligation on states towards the realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights such as the rights to food, health, housing, education, and work. General or basic 
obligations towards the rights to non-discrimination, legal remedies and effective 
participation are also of an immediate nature and not subject to progressive realization 
(CESCR 1990; UNDP 2000; Green 2001; Chapman and Russell 2002; Sepúlveda 2002; 
van Bueren 2002). Civil and political rights are considered to impose the obligation 
towards immediate realization. This distinction between immediate and progressive 
realization has been challenged by recent developments in law and its interpretation (Eide 
2001; CRC 2003; Chapman 2007). For example, Donnelly (2007: 48-50) suggests with 
14
the support of empirical examples that all human rights go through a process of 
development which reaches a minimal level of achievement in the institutionalization of 
these norms. The fulfillment of rights, however, is an ongoing recursive process that is 
contingent on existing socio-political and economic circumstances. 
Measures for rights in policy are to date underdeveloped and tend to over rely on proxy 
measures of taken from the development literature, such as the Human Development 
Index (Kimenyi 2007; ul Haq 2003) and the Physical Quality of Life Index (Milner et al. 
2004; Moon and Dixon 1985, 1992;), or are derived using such measures as against rights 
in principle measures and other indicators to show the gap between state capacity and 
state willingness to realize such rights (see, e.g. Cingranelli and Richards 2007). The 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights along with a team of international 
experts, has been at the forefront of developing measures that more accurately represent 
the complexities of rights in policy outlined here (UN 2006, 2008).
Rights in practice
The last concept that would help explain the meaning of human rights has been 
conceptualized as the ‘dimensions’ of human rights. This notion of dimensions has 
evolved from capturing the temporal evolution of rights to highlighting the precise nature 
of the legal obligations of states and the policy and practical implications of fulfilling 
these commitments. Civil and political rights were often considered to be ‘negative 
rights’ as their implementation supposedly required the state to simply refrain from 
interfering in their enjoyment. Economic, social, cultural, and solidarity rights, on the 
15
other hand, were referred to as ‘positive rights’ as their implementation was thought to 
require investment of limited state resources for their enjoyment. These distinctions 
present a ‘false dichotomy’ between the categories of rights. All rights have positive and 
negative characteristics, with the state being obligated to desist from actively preventing 
the enjoyment of rights as well as to put into place policies to facilitate their pursuit. This 
has been reiterated by the Committee on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) (CESCR 1990; Holmes 
1999; CCPR 2004; UNDP 2006; Donnelly 2007). 
The ‘dimensions’ of rights have since then been reconceptualized along the lines of an 
‘obligations’ approach, which  relates to the obligations that States are bound to uphold 
as members to international treaties and covenants (Eide 1989; Sepúlveda 2003; 
Chapman 2007). The obligations of States to respect, protect, and fulfill rights were 
originally thought of with respect to the rights in the UNCESCR and applied by the 
CESCR to the rights to adequate food, education and health (CESCR 1999a, 1999b, 
2000). The UNDP then adapted this framework to specify states’ obligations towards all 
human rights, an application that was later recognized by the CCPR (CESCR 1999b: 
para. 15; UNDP 2000; CCPR 2004). The obligation to respect rights entails refraining 
from actively depriving people of a guaranteed right. This requires States Parties not to 
deny or limit access to the enjoyment of rights and desist from a policy of direct or 
indirect discrimination. The obligation to protect rights involves preventing other actors –
individuals, groups or corporations – from depriving people of a guaranteed right. 
Finally, the obligation to fulfill rights refers to working actively to ensure through the 
16
creation of systems of governance, the provision of resources and infrastructure that all 
individuals enjoy the rights guaranteed to them under international law. This obligation 
would expect the state to execute policies that for example, eliminate discrimination 
based on sex or race in the workplace, or provide access to primary and higher education 
to economically deprived or socially excluded sections of the population (UNDP 2000; 
Green 2001; Sepúlveda 2003; Landman 2006b).
As for rights in policy, rights in practice measures are very much in need of development 
to capture the full array of standards, dimensions, and principles outlined here. For 
example, events-based and standards-based data (e.g. Freedom House, Political Terror
Scale) on human rights typically measure state and non-state violations of civil and 
political rights but not economic and social rights, although the CIRI human rights data 
project has developed comparable measures of the violation of worker rights and 
women’s economic and social rights.9 Socio-economic and administrative statistics, on 
the other hand, have been used to provide proxy measures for the fulfillment of economic 
and social rights, but they have not been widely used to capture the respect for, or 
protection of, civil and political rights (see Landman 2002, 2006b). Since our framework 
moves away from a strict separation between positive and negative conceptions of human 
rights, it is clear that it is possible to develop measures of, for example, state investment 
in the judiciary, electoral administration, prisons, and other institutions whose remit is to 
guarantee the protection of particular sets of civil and political rights.
                                                
9 See Stohl et al., 1984; Stohl et al.,1986; Gibney and Stohl 1988; Gastil 1990; Cingranelli and Richards 
2007
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MEASUREMENT COMPLEXITY, VALIDITY, AND VIABILITY
The conception of human rights as derived from international law has now been outlined 
from which it is clear that the concept consists of three constitutive elements: standards 
that determine the limits of state behaviour towards its residents and its obligations to 
enable the enjoyment of their rights (i.e. rights in principle); the policies that are 
implemented to realize these rights (i.e. rights as policy); and the actual realization of the 
three dimensions of these rights (i.e. rights in practice). Each of these constitutive 
elements is further divided into a set of indicators as a tangible measure of an abstract 
concept. However, like any other concept in the social sciences, human rights has 
attracted complex and contested meanings; the intricate latticework of concepts that 
constitute human rights have often led to problems of validity and viability in developing 
measures for monitoring human rights. Even though we have highlighted and provided 
examples of existing measures that have begun to capture the various standards, 
dimensions, and principles of human rights outlined here, we nevertheless think that 
significant questions remain. What do we measure when we measure human rights? Do 
indicators used to measure the concept do the job? Can viable human rights measures –
indicators that do not consume financial and human resources and are easily available 
and accessible – also be valid? This section of the paper presents four pathways that have 
been suggested to address this tradeoff between the complexity, validity, and viability of 
measurement:
a) The ‘basic rights’ argument – the list of rights protected in international law can 
be reduced to a select set of rights to be used as proxy measures for the others;
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b) The ‘obligations’ argument – at a minimum, human rights measures should reflect 
the de facto protection of rights in a state; 
c) The ‘implementation’ argument – human rights measures should reflect the claim 
that human rights are concerned with the process of achieving rights and not just 
their outcome; and,
d) The ‘unique rights’ argument – each right enshrines a distinct obligation that is 
not reducible to a general set of principles; therefore, each human right needs to
be modeled separate and distinct from other rights.
The ‘basic rights’ argument
The notion of ‘basic rights’ might be traced back to the Lockean conception of natural 
rights to life, liberty and property. In more recent times, it has been argued that the list of 
rights that were set out in the UDHR and subsequently protected by the two Covenants 
and regional treaties could be reduced, for a variety of reasons, to a ‘short-list’ (Donnelly 
and Howard 1988: 214). These vary from Shue’s (1996)set of three rights (security, 
subsistence, and liberty rights, mirroring Locke), Donnelly and Howard’s (1988) list of 
ten rights grouped into four clusters (survival rights, membership rights, protection rights, 
and empowerment rights), and Nickel’s (2007) identification of seven families of rights 
(security rights, due process rights, liberty rights, rights of political participation, equality 
rights, social rights, and rights of distinctive groups). If we accept the idea that rights are 
interdependent, then Donnelly and Howard (1988) suggest that a set of rights could be 
selected as complementary to the rights enshrined in the UDHR. These scholars have 
presented a theoretically substantiated argument for this exercise in reduction, thus 
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ensuring that indicators used to measure these rights would be valid and the conclusions 
drawn from the results of the assessment could be generalized to the broader family of 
rights. Moreover, narrowing down the list of rights to be monitored by states would be 
viable since it would enable the freeing up of limited resources and significantly diminish 
the complexity in measurement of human rights (Donnelly and Howard 1988; Shue 1996; 
Nickel 2007: 92-103). Following this suggestion might reduce the breadth of rights to be 
monitored; however, the complexity of the measurement (suggested by the model 
mapped out in Figure 1) remains untouched. 
The ‘obligations’ argument
This alternative is an attempt to reduce the complexity of rights measurement while 
attempting to retain the validity of the measures used and making the process of 
measurement a viable one. Since the international law of human rights creates obligations 
on states to respect, protect, and fulfill rights, it would be essential to map, at least this de 
facto enjoyment of rights. The combination of an ‘obligations’ approach with the 
classification of categories suggests a simple 2x3 framework of measurement of rights
(see Landman 2006b). Undoubtedly, developing indicators and monitoring the protection 
of rights using this framework is not resource-intensive. The framework is easy to
understand and apply (see UNDP 2000: 102; Landman 2006b). However, the inherent 
simplicity of this alternative might present the temptation to measure outcomes without 
adequate disaggregation to capture elements of non-discrimination. The lack of indicators 
on the process of implementation raises questions about the validity of the measures used. 
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In this paper, we have therefore proposed the further ‘layers’ of availability, accessibility, 
adaptability, and acceptability to capture these important principles.
The ‘implementation’ argument
Since human rights are concerned with the process of achieving rights and not just their 
outcome, measuring the implementation of policies drawn up for the enjoyment of human 
rights would be an essential part of measuring rights. One such framework incorporates 
the constitutive elements of the conceptual model outlined above and applies this to the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health (see Figure 2). This example includes 
specific indicators on the policy process. Input indicators that are included here measure 
the investment and expenditure of State resources to establish institutions, infrastructure, 
programmes, etc. to implement a right. Process indicators measure the implementation of
policies and provisions at the different stages. Performance indicators map the time taken 
to produce the various outputs pre-determined by the policies and programmes. Output 
indicators measure the immediate results of a particular policy. Outcome indicators map
the long-term effect of a policy or programme as well as the overall enjoyment of a right
(UNDP 2002; Landman and Häusermann 2003; Shrestha and Oiron 2006). The 
framework also incorporates the four human rights principles of non-discrimination, 
participation, effective remedy and adequate realization to assess the implementation of 
state policies (UNDP 2000). While this framework of indicators may be valid, i.e. they 
measure rights as opposed to the outcome of the enjoyment of rights; the tradeoff here 
has clearly been with the issue of complexity and validity.
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[Figure 2 here]
The ‘unique rights’ argument
The fourth and final alternative to addressing the tradeoff between the complexity, 
validity, and viability of rights measures is the argument that each human right is unique 
in the claims that individuals enjoy and the obligations that states accede to. 
Consequently, a general conceptual model of human rights is not applicable. Each human 
right would be measured using a distinct framework mapping the meaning of the right as
protected in international law. This would be based on the interpretation of the right 
published by treaty bodies and special procedures which clarify the nature of the 
obligations of states with respect to the right and the process to be followed to implement 
the provisions of the treaty with respect to that right. One such example is the work of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health and the 
researchers who have assisted him in clarifying the meaning of the right to health and 
developing indicators to measure its implementation (see Figure 4; Hunt 2003a, 2006; 
Backman et al 2008). Like the previous alternative, the measures adopted here are valid 
but complex and not viable for states to develop and use. 
[Figure 3 here]
The four alternative pathways discussed above reflect efforts to address the trade-off 
between the complexity and viability of human rights measurement while attempting to 
produce valid measures for the purpose. Figure 4 summarises these relationships and 
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highlights various measures that have been used to monitor human rights. We suggest 
that there is a direct and negative relationship between measurement complexity and 
viability. The adoption of a complex conceptual framework for measurement might 
reduce its viability (with respect to financial costs, and the availability and accessibility 
of the data required). The validity of the measures used is determined by the  model of 
human rights suggested in Figure 1. Human rights measures could either be employed to 
map the complete conceptual framework of human rights or certain constitutive elements. 
This choice has a related impact (which may be negative or positive) on measurement 
viability.
To date, there have been significant attempts to measure various elements of the 
framework develop here as well as the alternative pathways outlined above. As we have 
mentioned briefly in the paper, there are events-based measures, standards-based 
measures, survey-based measures, and official socio-economic and administrative 
statistics. Survey-based measures and official statistics have been employed as measures 
in all four pathways, while events-based measures and standards-based measures have 
been utilised in some of these alternatives. The choice of pathway to adopt in human 
rights measurement depends on the goals of measurement and the resources available for 
the purpose. A researcher would be expected to prioritize from the three components of 
measurement complexity, validity, and viability and select an alternative best suited to 
her needs.
[Figure 4 here]
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SUMMARY
This paper has sought to highlight the complex content of human rights as derived from 
international human rights law with the purpose of establishing clarity in its monitoring 
and measurement. The first section described the international law of human rights as it 
assists in mapping the distinct contours of the concept of human rights. We suggested 
that this concept could be understood at three conceptual levels: the basic level which 
related to the core content of human rights, the secondary level which highlighted the 
constitutive elements of the concept, and the indicator/data level which operationalised 
these elements into distinct measures. This operationalisation, however, is not as simple 
as developing a basic set of indicators that are then used to assign scores to units. Rather, 
the content of human rights, it was shown, involves a complex web of understandings 
that can be broadly defined in terms of the standards, dimensions, and organising 
principles, each of which requires different sets of indicators, which in turn, have been 
measured using events-based data, standards-based data, survey-based data, and socio-
economic and administrative statistics. The final section presented a comparative account
of the trade-off between complexity, validity, and viability of the measurement of this 
concept. Researchers and social scientists continue to grapple with making human rights 
easier to measure, collect data, understand, and interpret, but we believe that renewed 
attention is needed to the complexity of the content of rights as they are mean to be 
realised across the globe. We hope that our paper contributes to this renewed attention.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: The complexity of human rights content
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Reproduced from Carvalho 2008: 551-552
Figure 2. Assessing States’ children’s rights obligations using the child’s right to health as an example 
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Source: Backman et al. 2008: 2054
Figure 3. Right-to-health features of a health system underpinned by legal obligations based on 
General Comment 14: preliminary working model
Alternative Complexity Viability Validity Measures that 
can be used
Basic rights Medium Medium High All 
Obligations Low High Low All  
Implementation High Low Medium SYB, SAS
Unique rights High Low NA EB, SYB, SAS
Notes: NA – not applicable vis-à-vis the conceptual model of human rights
EB – events based measures STB – standards based measures
SYB – survey based measures SAS – socio-economic and administrative statistics
Figure 4: Trade-off between measurement complexity, validity, and viability
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Table 1. List of human rights protected under international law
1. Non-discrimination
2. Life
3. Liberty and security of the person
4. Protection against slavery and servitude
5. Protection against torture
6. Legal personality
7. Equal protection of the law
8. Legal remedy
9. Protection against arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile
10. Access to independent and impartial 
tribunal
11. Presumption of innocence
12. Protection against ex post facto laws
13. Privacy, family, home and 
correspondence
14. Freedom of movement and residence
15. Nationality
16. Marry and found a family
17. Protection and assistance of families
18. Marriage only with free consent of 
spouses
19. Equal rights of men and women in 
marriage
20. Freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion
21. Freedom of opinion and expression
22. Freedom of the press
23. Freedom of assembly
24. Freedom of association
25. Participation in government
26. Social security
27. Work
28. No compulsory or forced labour
29. Just and favourable conditions of work
30. Trade unions
31. Rest, leisure and paid holidays
32. Adequate standard of living
33. Education
34. Participation in cultural life
35. Self-determination
36. Protection of and assistance to children
37. Freedom from hunger
38. Health
39. Asylum
40. Property
41. Compulsory primary education
42. Humane treatment when deprived of 
liberty
43. Protection against imprisonment for debt
44. Expulsion of aliens only by law
45. Prohibition of war propaganda and 
incitement to discrimination
46. Minority culture
47. No imprisonment for breach of civil 
obligations
48. Protection of children
49. Access to public service
50. Democracy
51. Participation in cultural and scientific 
life
52. Protection of intellectual property rights
53. International and social order for 
realizing rights
54. Political self-determination
55. Economic self-determination
56. Women’s rights
57. Prohibition of the death penalty
58. Prohibition of apartheid
Sources: Davidson 1993: Appendix 1; Gibson 1996: 37-38; Green 2001: 1069; Donnelly 2003: 24
Reproduced from Landman, 2006a: 16
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